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3THE END OF MAY
Historians will be generally unkind to Theresa May. 
Indeed, they have already begun to be so. In his lengthy, 
well-informed account of May’s premiership, Anthony 
Seldon writes: “Her Brexit declarations were a slate of 
amateur contradictions”.1 Poorly advised, not only did she 
not know what she meant in insisting that “Brexit means 
Brexit” and “no deal is better than a bad deal”, but she 
had no idea whether her bid for a bespoke arrangement 
with the European Union (EU) was remotely possible. 
“The many difficulties she faced when she 
became PM cannot be an excuse for the unforced 
errors she made through ignorance, intransigence 
and ineptitude.”2
May’s dithering was fatal. She was an unconvincing 
advocate of the Withdrawal Agreement and Political 
Declaration she had secured from the EU in November 
2018. Her first attempt (15 January 2019) to win the 
approval of the House of Commons for the package deal 
was lost by a staggering 230 votes. A belated effort to win 
over the Labour party to her deal was welcomed in Brussels 
but made no headway in London.3 The EU reluctantly but 
hopelessly agreed for the second time to extend the Article 
50 process, until 31 October.4 But on 24 July Boris Johnson 
supplanted Theresa May as prime minister. 
Johnson had waged war against May and her deal for two 
years. As a character he seems less virtuous than May, but 
his leadership is more persuasive. On Brexit, especially, 
Johnson is purposeful. His mission to “Get Brexit Done” 
came as a relief to EU negotiators whose patience with 
the querulous May had worn thin.5 The European Council 
concluded a revised deal on 17 October.6 On 22 October, 
Johnson even managed to win the second reading of 
the Withdrawal Agreement Bill by 30 votes, although he 
lost (by 14) the necessary accompanying resolution on 
timetabling procedure. 
The European Council accepted the need to extend Article 
50 yet again, until 31 January 2020, while the UK went 
back to the polls.7 At the general election on 12 December 
the Conservatives won an overall majority of 80 and a 
majority of 162 over the Labour party, which was reduced 
to its lowest number of MPs since 1935. The Liberal 
Democrats gained votes but lost one seat and their leader, 
Jo Swinson. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) lost two 
seats and their leader at Westminster, Nigel Dodds.  
In Brussels the UK election result was 
taken as confirming the outcome of the 
2016 referendum.
In Brussels the UK election result was taken as confirming 
the outcome of the 2016 referendum. Accordingly, a 
revised version of the Withdrawal Agreement Bill won its 
second reading on 20 December with a majority of 124. 
The remaining stages of the Bill will be completed in 
order for the European Parliament to vote its consent to 
the deal on 29 January.8 The Council will then conclude 
the agreement on behalf of the Union in time for Britain’s 
final departure on 31st, a full seven, destructive years after 
David Cameron’s fatal speech (talking of unforced errors) 
in that Bloomberg basement.9
THE NEW DEAL ON IRELAND
In accepting the revised Withdrawal Agreement and 
Political Declaration, the Union is able to claim that it 
upholds its original Brexit guidelines. Boris Johnson has 
decided to revert to an earlier proposal of February 2018, 
promoted by Michel Barnier, whereby only Northern 
Ireland and not the UK will remain part of the EU  
customs territory. 
The Irish Protocol is no longer an insurance policy to be 
used as a backstop but will be fully operative from the 
end of the transition period. Mercifully, the spotlight is 
taken off the unicorn hunt for ‘max fac’ technological 
solutions to border controls which so obsessed the 
arch-Brexiteers (but not Johnson). The new Protocol 
will apply whether or not the UK concludes a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the EU. As part of the British 
customs union, Northern Ireland will therefore be liable 
to benefit from any free trade agreements that London 
can hack with the outside world. 
The EU Customs Code will apply to all goods entering 
Northern Ireland, so there will be no need for ‘hard border’ 
customs controls on the island of Ireland. Northern Ireland 
will remain subject to EU single market rules concerning 
manufactured goods, SPS rules, agri-foods, VAT, excise, 
the single electricity market and state aid rules. Northern 
Irish business will have “unfettered access” to the market 
in Great Britain (subject to summary exit declarations as 
prescribed by the EU Customs Code).
Only goods entering Northern Ireland from Great Britain 
(or elsewhere) en route to Ireland will be subject to EU 
customs duties. The Joint Committee established as the 
lynchpin of the governance arrangements under the 
4Withdrawal Agreement will oversee the management 
of this filtering process and will establish criteria to 
identify goods “at risk of moving into the EU”.10 Where 
EU duties are higher than those of the UK, the British 
authorities may reimburse Northern Ireland business. Her 
Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) will continue to be 
responsible for applying the EU’s VAT rules for goods in 
Northern Ireland.  
In any event, the sectarian DUP has lost  
its presumptive power of veto over the 
future of the province.
The UK will be responsible to the EU for carrying out 
the necessary regulatory checks on goods sent to 
Northern Ireland, but these inspections will happen at 
designated places away from the North-South border. 
This arrangement imposes tougher checks across the 
Irish Sea – the notion that so distressed the DUP (and 
Theresa May). Boris Johnson promises that these mainly 
regulatory controls will be light-touch, but they will 
have to be credible as far as the European Commission is 
concerned. The European Court of Justice will continue 
to oversee the application of EU law in Northern Ireland. 
Faithful to the spirit of the 1998 Belfast Good Friday 
Agreement, these special arrangements for Northern 
Ireland are to be made subject to the consent of the 
Stormont Assembly, by a simple majority, four years after 
the end of the transition period. A consent by simple 
majority will be subject to a further vote in four years’ 
time. If, however, there is cross-community consent 
according to a qualified majority, the next test will  
come in eight years.11 In any event, the sectarian DUP  
has lost its presumptive power of veto over the future of 
the province.
THE NEW DEAL ON THE FUTURE RELATIONSHIP
The Irish Protocol apart, the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement 
remains the same as its 2018 predecessor. No change is 
made to May’s deal on citizens’ rights or the financial 
settlement. As the EU always promised, however, it has 
had no difficulty in adjusting the Political Declaration to 
reflect the stance of the new government on the matter of 
the future relationship.  
Boris Johnson seeks to make much of his 
renegotiation of the Political Declaration.
The Political Declaration is part and parcel of the 
statutory process of secession as laid down in Article 
50(2) TEU. It is incorrect, as many have done, to simply 
dismiss the document as non-binding. The Declaration 
is referred to in the Withdrawal Agreement treaty and is 
liable to be used in any court that is asked to interpret 
that Agreement. The purpose of the Political Declaration 
is political, first, to steer the 27 EU member states in 
one direction in advance of the actual negotiation of the 
future relationship (which can only start after the UK has 
formally left the Union), and, second, to commit the UK 
government to that same course. 
Boris Johnson seeks to make much of his renegotiation 
of the Political Declaration. He has removed references 
to the single customs territory and the consequent 
need for the UK “to consider aligning with Union rules 
in relevant areas”.12 Although the new document still 
commits both parties to developing “an ambitious, 
broad, deep and flexible partnership” across trade, 
the economy, and political and security cooperation, 
it adds that at the core of the partnership will be “a 
comprehensive and balanced Free Trade Agreement”.13 
May’s “trading relationship on goods that is as  
close as possible” becomes Johnson’s “ambitious 
trading relationship”.14
Nevertheless, the significance of the changes need 
not be exaggerated.15 The 2019 version of the Political 
Declaration retains this aide-memoire to the legacy of  
EU membership:
“The period of the UK’s membership of the 
Union has resulted in a high level of integration 
between the Union’s and the UK’s economies, 
and an interwoven past and future of the Union’s 
and the UK’s people and priorities. The future 
relationship will inevitably need to take account 
of this unique context. While it cannot amount 
to the rights or obligations of membership, the 
Parties are agreed that the future relationship 
should be approached with high ambition with 
regard to its scope and depth, and recognise that 
this might evolve over time.”16
Although arch-Brexiteers have missed the point, Boris 
Johnson seems to know perfectly well that even a minimal 
FTA means meeting the EU’s fundamental requirements 
of fair trade and competition to prevent undercutting 
the Union’s internal market. So the EU dislikes the UK’s 
downplaying of the concept of regulatory alignment but 
it is pleasantly surprised that Johnson has maintained 
5intact his predecessor’s political commitment to the level 
playing field. Paragraph 77 is key:
“Given the Union and the United Kingdom’s 
geographic proximity and economic 
interdependence, the future relationship 
must ensure open and fair competition, 
encompassing robust commitments to ensure 
a level playing field. The precise nature of 
commitments should be commensurate with 
the scope and depth of the future relationship 
and the economic connectedness of the 
Parties. These commitments should prevent 
distortions of trade and unfair competitive 
advantages. To that end, the Parties should 
uphold the common high standards applicable 
in the Union and the United Kingdom at the 
end of the transition period in the areas of 
state aid, competition, social and employment 
standards, environment, climate change, and 
relevant tax matters. The Parties should in 
particular maintain a robust and comprehensive 
framework for competition and state aid 
control that prevents undue distortion of trade 
and competition; commit to the principles of 
good governance in the area of taxation and 
to the curbing of harmful tax practices; and 
maintain environmental, social and employment 
standards at the current high levels provided 
by the existing common standards. In so doing, 
they should rely on appropriate and relevant 
Union and international standards, and include 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure effective 
implementation domestically, enforcement and 
dispute settlement. The future relationship 
should also promote adherence to and effective 
implementation of relevant internationally 
agreed principles and rules in these domains, 
including the Paris Agreement.”
The Johnson government in 2019 confirms the bulk of 
the commitments made by the May government in 2018. 
The UK is still committed in the Political Declaration 
to negotiating a new customs arrangement, as well 
as additional agreements to preserve cross-Channel 
connectivity, nuclear safety and common fisheries. 
No material change is made to the section on trade in 
services, immigration or cooperation in foreign policy, 
security and defence. 
MORE OR LESS GOVERNANCE
The revised Political Declaration shortens the section 
on governance. In particular, the reference to the joint 
governance arrangements of the transition period as 
being the basis of what might follow is removed. The 
new government wants to adopt the classical dispute 
settlement procedures of an FTA under international law 
involving a “flexible mediation mechanism”.17
The EU is concerned to keep post-Brexit Britain within 
a single coherent legal system that will facilitate the 
monitoring, and if necessary correction, of whatever 
level playing field arrangements are made. Nobody 
wants the UK to end up with a litigious muddle of 
bilateral agreements, like another Switzerland. The 
better template is offered by the Ukraine Association 
Agreement of 2014, whereby the EU demands robust 
joint governance arrangements as its price for allowing 
greater market access. For the UK this joint governance 
is clearly established under the Withdrawal Agreement 
for the transition period, with a longer extension to 
uphold the citizens’ rights machinery. The EU will try 
to persuade the UK to stand firm behind similar joint 
governance for the longer term. 
It matters, therefore, that the transition period proves 
to be a successful experiment and serves to boost 
confidence in the concept of joint governance. During 
the transition period, the UK stands to enjoy parity 
of esteem with the EU institutions in an elaborate 
apparatus of multi-level joint ministerial, official, expert 
and parliamentary meetings. Boris Johnson will already 
be looking forward to a major summit meeting to be 
held in June with the Presidents of the Commission 
and European Council. It is unlikely that he will want 
to forego such privileged status under the terms of any 
final agreement. 
In fact, although truncated, the new Political 
Declaration does not contradict the joint governance 
apparatus agreed by Theresa May. Away from trade 
in goods, in areas such as cooperation in security and 
British participation in EU sectoral programmes, such 
as R&D, the aegis of EU law will continue to run under 
the authority of the Court of Justice.18 The UK’s appetite 
to participate in the work of the EU agencies will only 
become evident during the transition period as the 
negotiations on the future association unroll. But it is 
not in the Union’s interest to exclude the British from 
participation, even with observer status, if the agencies 
contribute (as they should) to the smooth running of the 
level playing field. 
It is encouraging, therefore, that the Johnson version 
of the Political Declaration still commits both parties 
to establishing “a Joint Committee responsible for 
managing and supervising the implementation and 
operation of the future relationship, facilitating the 
resolution of disputes, … and making recommendations 
concerning its evolution”.19 And the parties once again 
“note that the overarching institutional framework 
could take the form of an Association Agreement”.20
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Much remains yet to be revealed about the UK’s 
final negotiating stance. During the general election 
campaign, Johnson’s rhetoric was gung-ho. Fresh from 
his electoral victory, however, the prime minister has 
toned down the rhetoric – and even wants us to stop 
using the term ‘Brexit’.  
What is clear is that Boris Johnson has 
lowered the level of ambition in terms of 
future alignment by rejecting the notion of 
the single customs territory for the whole 
of the UK.
What is clear is that Boris Johnson has lowered the level 
of ambition in terms of future alignment by rejecting 
the notion of the single customs territory for the whole 
of the UK. Nonetheless, he will accept the EU’s level 
playing field conditions in order to secure its initial FTA, 
and he does not appear to be excluding the possibility 
of future agreements based on dynamic regulatory 
alignment in specific fields, notably in services. 
As far as the EU is concerned, if it can secure a British 
trade agreement based on no tariffs, no tariff quotas and 
no dumping, further development of the partnership 
would be welcome. After the bruising experience of 
secession, however, rebuilding mutual trust is at a 
premium, and the sooner an FTA can be put in place the 
better for both parties. That is the main task in 2020. 
On 13 December 2019, the European Council instructed 
the Commission and Council to prepare a draft 
comprehensive mandate for the negotiation of the 
future relationship in line with the Political Declaration 
and the previously agreed guidelines. It also reappointed 
Michel Barnier as the Union’s chief negotiator. To signal 
the end of the secession process and the beginning of 
a negotiation with a third country, Barnier’s task force 
unit TF50 was rapidly (and carefully) renamed UKTF. 
Following a series of Commission seminars for the 
Council during January, the draft mandate will be 
published soon after 1 February in the hope that it 
can be signed off by the General Affairs Council on 
25 February. No emergency meeting of the European 
Council is foreseen. The mandate will cover all aspects 
of the future relationship on the understanding that the 
27 member states will commit themselves individually, 
collectively and finally to settling the British business.21 
As far as the EU is concerned, if it can 
secure a British trade agreement based on 
no tariffs, no tariff quotas and no dumping, 
further development of the partnership 
would be welcome.
The Political Declaration stipulates that, immediately 
after 31 January, the two parties will agree on the 
structure, format and schedule of the negotiating 
rounds, including parallel work.22
TIMETABLING
The EU is right to proceed on the assumption that Boris 
Johnson means what he says about not wanting to extend 
the transition period beyond the end of 2020. Bizarrely, 
he is even legislating to prevent such an extension.23 
In theory, according to Article 132 of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, the Joint Committee can decide, before  
1 July, to extend the transition period by one or two 
years. In practice, such an extension would cause intense 
frustration not only to the two parties to the negotiation 
but also to business and international stakeholders 
who need urgent clarity as to the nature of the final 
trade relationship. Extending the transition to 2021 or 
2022 would further complicate the already complicated 
internal EU row over its new budgetary cycle. And it 
would for Johnson be a major embarrassment. 
The EU is right to proceed on the 
assumption that Boris Johnson means 
what he says about not wanting to  
extend the transition period beyond  
the end of 2020.
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the negotiations. Top priority will be an FTA based on 
no tariffs, no tariff quotas and no dumping. As we have 
noted, the Union’s principal interest lies in defending the 
level playing field of the internal market. Starting from 
the situation where the UK is fully aligned with all aspects 
of the EU acquis, it will not be difficult to install in the 
FTA standard non-regression clauses on environmental 
protection, labour standards and state aid. The EU is 
particularly concerned to ensure that the Irish Protocol 
arrangements will be fully operable on time by the end of 
the year, and a nil tariff FTA with the UK would seem to be 
a prerequisite for such facilitation. 
In addition, the FTA will need to be accompanied by 
possibly five side agreements to continue current 
arrangements in the sphere of internal security.24 Other 
items, such as aviation and financial services, will need 
more months to negotiate and can be covered pro tem 
by contingency measures. Further aspects of a deeper 
relationship – such as foreign, security and defence  
policy – are deserving of more reflection.
The Political Declaration stipulates that certain urgent 
matters will be concluded in the course of 2020. These 
are an agreement on data protection, equivalence 
assessments for financial services (by June), and fisheries 
(in time for 2021). Boldly, it is the “clear intent” of both 
parties to conclude the arrangements summarised in 
the Declaration by the end of 2020.25 The June summit 
meeting will assess progress.26
EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE
An important consideration on the EU side is to ensure 
that the FTA and fisheries agreement will be treated by 
its member states and by the European Parliament as a 
matter of the Union’s exclusive competence.27 This will 
expedite the conclusion of the agreement and negate 
the need for ratification by all national and regional 
parliaments of the 27 states. 
Common commercial policy and fisheries are 
quintessentially exclusive Union competence, and recent 
case law of the Court of Justice on the modern raft of 
bilateral trade agreements has rather strengthened the 
autonomy of the Commission by delimiting the scope of 
mixed competence.28 It is clear that questions of taxation, 
non-direct foreign investment and investor dispute 
settlement are mixed competence best left to a later 
stage of a final association agreement. But an exclusive 
competence FTA with the UK can easily accommodate 
not only trade in goods but also services, including 
transport, mutual recognition for service providers, 
public procurement, sustainable development, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), intellectual property rights (IPR), 
competition policy and data exchange. Sensibly, the 
initial FTA could also contain a review clause to allow for 
its later upgrading – including a review of the customs 
union option.29
FISHERIES
And then there is fish – or as the Political Declaration 
calls it ‘fishing opportunities’. Again, no change is made 
in the revised version. Having noted that the UK will 
have become again an independent coastal state, it is 
agreed that “within the context of the overall economic 
partnership the Parties should establish a new fisheries 
agreement on, inter alia, access to waters and quota 
shares”.30 Ideally, an agreement for 2021 has to be in place 
by the summer of 2020 to allow fishing fleets to adjust to 
the new situation.
It is no secret that British fishermen were amongst the 
most vocal Brexiteers. Massive delusions were peddled 
in the referendum campaign about sovereign waters and 
the Britishness of fish – delusions which wholly missed 
the point about the need for reciprocal market access 
and the need for common European action to preserve 
stocks. An unpopular deal will be done with the French, 
the Danes and the Spanish, as it is every year, but this 
time Whitehall and Edinburgh and not Brussels will have 
to take the rap. The government must hope that the wider 
public will not be paying much attention to the detail of a 
post-Brexit rumpus on fish.  
The government must hope that the  
wider public will not be paying much 
attention to the detail of a post-Brexit 
rumpus on fish.
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The UK government must take many steps, in a hurry, 
to ensure that the post-Brexit arrangements are up and 
running in twelve months’ time. The new Parliament at 
Westminster faces a heavy legislative load of up to nine 
Brexit bills, including agriculture, data, employment, 
environment, extradition and immigration. The  
devolved parliaments also have work to do in their 
respective spheres.  
Not least among the challenges is to create 
in the UK a robust regulatory framework 
to take over the work of surveillance and 
supervision previously undertaken by the 
European Commission.
Not least among the challenges is to create in the UK 
a robust regulatory framework to take over the work of 
surveillance and supervision previously undertaken by 
the European Commission. The Withdrawal Agreement 
Bill will create the Independent Monitoring Authority 
for Citizens’ Rights (IMA).31 The new Office for 
Environmental Protection (OfEP) will be created under 
a separate environment bill.32 Another autonomous 
regulator is being planned for workers’ rights. These 
bodies will not be Quangos, subject to ministerial 
direction, but empowered as a last resort to take ministers 
to court. The powers of some existing UK bodies, such as 
the Food Standards Agency and the Financial Conduct 
Authority, need to be upgraded to shoulder new duties 
guaranteeing the non-regression clauses of the level 
playing field and, as and when necessary, to monitor 
Britain’s regulatory alignment with the EU acquis. 
The UK has a job to appoint capable people to these 
authorities without stripping Whitehall of talent. 
Already questions are asked about the capability of 
HMRC to manage its new workload at Britain’s many 
ports of entry and exit. Not all the heavy administrative 
burden caused by Brexit falls on the UK: the French and 
Belgian authorities at Calais and Zeebrugge have a large 
task ahead in having to check to the satisfaction of the 
Commission what comes into the EU from England. 
At the same time, the UK government will have to name 
its representatives on the Joint Committee structure at 
ministerial and official level, as well as appoint members 
of the arbitral tribunal. Brussels hopes that the latter will 
be British judges schooled deeply in EU law (they exist). 
PARLIAMENTARY SCRUTINY
The UK Parliament will have to run to catch up with the 
rapid-fire decisions of the executive in delivering Brexit. 
Opposition MPs will doubtless complain about the hard 
or limited nature of the FTA – and they may well come  
to regret that they failed in the last Parliament to  
deliver the softer version of Brexit on offer from May’s 
minority government.  
The UK Parliament would be wise 
immediately to initiate the setting up 
of a joint committee with the European 
Parliament, of perhaps 15 members on 
each side.
Nevertheless, intelligent detailed parliamentary 
criticism of the raft of necessary secondary legislation 
may certainly render some improvements, and the 
prime minister’s large majority gives him leeway to 
make concessions and change tack if he wishes to do so. 
Leniency on EU citizens struggling with the bureaucratic 
procedures to remain resident in the UK and guarantees 
of impartiality in the appointment of the IMA will help  
to satisfy the European Parliament that the deal must 
now be done. 
Parliamentary scrutiny at Westminster of the progress 
of the negotiations and of the performance of British 
ministers and officials in the Joint Committee will be 
of the essence. The Joint Committee of the transition 
period will be a powerful body, and its powers are likely 
to be further enhanced as and when it morphs into 
the new executive of a final association agreement.33 
So a new approach by the Commons to its previously 
lacklustre scrutiny of EU affairs is badly needed – possibly 
in conjunction with the better informed but politically 
neutered House of Lords.34 
The Political Declaration supports the “establishment 
of a dialogue between the European Parliament and the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom, where they see fit, 
in order for the legislatures to share views and expertise 
on issues related to the future relationship”.35 The UK 
9Parliament would be wise immediately to initiate the 
setting up of a joint committee with the European 
Parliament, of perhaps 15 members on each side. 
Parliamentarians should treat their participation in this 
joint committee as a matter of high importance. They 
should also encourage civil society dialogue to aid their 
parliamentary scrutiny. MEPs will be no less interested 
in the conduct by Michel Barnier and his team of the 
British negotiations, and are in a good position to insist 
on transparency. 
CAN IT BE DONE?
Many very well informed critics think it is impossible 
to conclude a comprehensive trade agreement by the 
end of 2020. Leading the sceptical field is Ivan Rogers, 
who thinks the worst of Brexit is yet to come.36 Mutjaba 
Rahman of the Eurasia Group believes the risk of a cliff 
edge ‘no deal’ exit next December is rising. Wolfgang 
Münchau is hesitant. My colleague Fabian Zuleeg is 
pessimistic. Doomsters and gloomsters populate my 
twitter feed.  
One may hope, however, for all our sakes, 
that 2020 will see a change of gear in 
Britain from ideology to pragmatism – that 
very quality for which British European 
policy used to be justly famed.
Amid all the speculation, much will depend on the 
degree to which the prime minister is really intent on 
diverging from EU norms. Presumably divergence is the 
whole point of Brexit. But Johnson’s own insistence on 
the very tight timetable gives the EU great leverage in 
the negotiations, and the Union will resist divergence 
where it can. 
Negotiators on both sides might make mistakes. EU unity 
might fracture when trade and fish are up for grabs. The 
imposition of tariffs may, in the end, be unavoidable. 
Dominic Cummings, the prime minister’s chief adviser, 
may really be the unremitting ideologue he is portrayed 
to be. Johnson himself may fall victim to braggadocio. 
The talks indeed may not succeed. 
One may hope, however, for all our sakes, that 2020 
will see a change of gear in Britain from ideology 
to pragmatism – that very quality for which British 
European policy used to be justly famed. The Withdrawal 
Agreement and Political Declaration, prepared 
for Johnson by his predecessor, are not negligible 
achievements in themselves and could be the pragmatic 
basis of a decent and durable association agreement that 
settles Europe’s British problem for some years to come. 
Conversely, leaving the EU badly will damage the UK 
badly. The argument for close economic ties with Britain’s 
largest trading partner is irrefutable. The softer the Brexit, 
the better it will be for those poorer northern towns 
which voted Tory at the election. The prime minister also 
knows that a hard Brexit will only reinforce separatist 
tendencies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
It would be a mistake to underestimate Boris Johnson. 
He can well survive as prime minister until the next 
general election in 2024 and beyond. He looks set to 
outlast most if not all the current members of the 
European Council. His chairmanship of the COP26 
conference in Glasgow in November will put him centre 
point on the world stage. At home, Labour is in a terrible 
mess. The government faces no significant political 
challenges at least until after the Scottish parliament 
elections in 2021. 
NO FIREWORKS
Nobody should underestimate the historic importance 
of Brexit. Whatever happens, the secession of the United 
Kingdom leaves the European Union smaller, weaker 
and poorer. The EU needs to move steadily forward 
in a federal direction to counter the risk of further 
disintegration. The UK has been concussed by the 
populist drama of Brexit, and is itself facing a period of 
constitutional uncertainty. 
Neither party will recover from malaise and concussion 
if the relationship between the two becomes embittered 
and argumentative, as it was in the 1960s before the 
UK joined. Both sides will have to work together if the 
Union’s estimable goal of good neighbourliness is to 
be achieved.37 Deeper reflection is called for on how 
Britain’s privileged partnership is going to evolve in the 
common interest.38
The quality of the UK’s contribution to the upcoming 
Conference on the Future of Europe, if it is invited to 
participate, may be an early indicator of future trends. 
There are some important lessons for the EU to learn 
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from the failure of British membership. Creative 
strategic thinking about how the post-Brexit Union can 
promote differentiated integration across the wider 
Europe would be of value to the whole neighbourhood, 
as well as to the Atlantic alliance.  
Deeper reflection is called for on how 
Britain’s privileged partnership is going to 
evolve in the common interest.
Midnight on 31 January will be a poignant moment. In 
Brussels, at least, there will be no fireworks. 
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